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To shed light on whether and how firms changed compensation practices in response
to a shift in the environment in which they operated, we examine whether there is
contagion effect of executive compensation regulation on state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) in the emerging market of China. Specifically, we investigate whether firms
not directly affected by the changing regulatory environment nonetheless changed
executive compensation in response to the actions of the directly affected firms, which is
called contagion effect. We further examine the specific contagion mechanisms and the
economic consequences of regulation on compensation. We find that the regulation has
a significant effect on compensation gap in central SOEs and a contagion effect on local
SOEs but not for non-SOEs. Within SOEs, there is an intra-industry contagion effect of
compensation regulation but not an intra-region effect. Further, central SOEs and local
SOEs experience reduced firm performance after the compensation regulations, but
not the non-SOEs; indicating that the compensation regulation does not have favorable
economic consequences for both the directly affected central SOEs and the indirectly
affected local SOEs.
Keywords: contagion effect, contagion mechanism, compensation regulation, economic consequence, merging
market, compensation

INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis of 2008 triggered a trend in governmental pay regulation world-wide,
which led to an increasing role of government regulations in corporate governance and regulations
on executive compensations in particular (e.g., Gouldman and Victoravich, 2020). In this study,
we investigate whether state-owned enterprises (SOEs)1 owned by the local governments in China
have mimicked their peers and changed their executive compensation packages subsequent to
the pay regulations on SOEs owned by the central-government. As the regulations which cause
a spread of regulation shock from central SOEs to local SOEs are originally intended to reduce
the pay gap between executives and average employees in the central SOEs, we name such a
1

Based on the ownership type, Chinese firms can be classified into central SOEs, local SOEs, and non-SOEs. Compared with
central SOEs owned by the central government, local SOEs owned by the local governments may enjoy longer grace period
and more freedom in complying with reform plans because local governments and local SOEs have more inputs on the details
of their own policies.
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phenomenon as a contagion effect.2 Compensation regulations in
China have existed for some time now. However, the traditional
compensation regulations resulted in large compensation gaps,
low employee morale, and low productivity. To enhance
the alignment between executive compensation and firm
performance, the Chinese government in September 2009
mandated that executive salaries in state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) owned by the central government should be performance
relevant. Nevertheless, how to reduce the compensation gap
between executives and average employees is another issue that
regulators and policymakers need to resolve. The global financial
crisis in 2008 increased the public attention to the compensation
gap, which also triggered a series of compensation regulations
in China. Among these regulations, the most significant one is
issued in February 2013, which regulates executive compensation
in central SOEs in all industries. We are interested in whether
there is a contagion effect of the 2013 compensation regulation
on local SOEs or non-SOEs.
According to Becker and Murphy (2000), the concept of
contagion can be traced back to a vast amount of sociology
literature on the consistent patterns of group formation.
People tend to associate with those who share their language,
political views, and demographics. In the corporate world,
firms often imitate their peers’ practices, especially in uncertain
environments. For instance, companies are more likely to
manage earnings after another firm in the same industry or
neighborhood announces a restatement (Kedia et al., 2015).
There is strong evidence on the usage of relative performance
evaluation using peer information matched on both industry
and size (Albuquerque, 2009). A number of studies have
documented peer group effects on executive compensation
(e.g., Bereskin and Cicero, 2013), but few have looked at the
contagion effect of compensation regulations. Different from
the prior literature which focuses on the direct effectiveness
of compensation regulation (Dhole et al., 2015), this study
examines whether compensation regulations of central SOEs
have a contagion effect on local SOEs. Our study also extends
the research on contagion effect of compensation to identify
the specific contagion mechanisms. Although the literature (e.g.,
Bereskin and Cicero, 2013) has documented the role of peer
group in executive compensation, few studies have investigated
the contagion effect of compensation regulations. Our study
documents additional evidence on the contagion mechanisms
from the perspective of executive compensation regulations.
Consistent with our hypotheses, we find there is a contagion
effect of the 2013 compensation regulation on local SOEs,
but not on non-SOEs. We also find that there is an intraindustry, but not intra-region contagion. Both the central SOEs
and local SOEs experience reduced firm performance after the
compensation regulations, indicating that the compensation
regulation does not have favorable economic consequences
for either the directly affected central SOEs or the indirectly
affected local SOEs.

Our study makes several contributions to the literature
on compensation regulation. First, until recently, few studies
have examined compensation regulatory policies (except for
Dhole et al., 2015). Different from the prior literature which
focuses on the direct effectiveness of compensation regulation
(Dhole et al., 2015), our study examines whether compensation
regulations of central SOEs have a contagion effect on local
SOEs. Second, our study extends the research on contagion
effect of compensation to identify the specific contagion
mechanisms. Although the literature (e.g., Bereskin and Cicero,
2013) has documented the role of peer group in executive
compensation, few studies have investigated the contagion effect
of compensation regulations. We find that the contagion effect
occurs within the same industry. Our study documents additional
evidence on the contagion mechanisms from the perspective
of executive compensation regulations. Last but not least, few
studies investigate the determinants of executive compensation
in Chinese domestic markets (Kato and Long, 2006). Our
study extends the existing literature on the determinants of
executive compensations by investigating whether governmentimposed regulations on central SOEs lead to changes in executive
compensation practices in local SOEs.
Our findings have implications for regulators and
policymakers. This study confirms government-imposed
regulations on central SOEs lead to changes in executive
compensation practices in local SOEs. The results show that the
compensation regulation has its positive effects, but it also causes
the problem of insufficient incentives in medium to long-run
for SOE executives, which has a certain downside impact on
corporate development. The enforcement of the compensation
regulations significantly differs in terms of regional development,
income gap, budget deficit, and unemployment rate. The
economic consequences of compensation regulation may
exceed its original intention. SOE executives are seeking for
alternative incentives, such as perks or on-job consumption to
make up for insufficient incentives. This study can contributes
to the government to make better and more sufficient SOE
compensation regulations and to further mobilize the enthusiasm
of the executives of SOEs.
The remainder of this study continues as follows. In
Section “Executive Compensation Regulations in China,” we
introduce the executive compensation regulations. In Section
“Literature Review and Hypotheses Development,” we discuss
the related literature and develop the hypotheses. Section
“Model Specification and Data” presents the data and outlines
the empirical approaches employed in the study. In Section
“Empirical Tests,” we discuss our primary results, and provide
concluding remarks in Section “Conclusion.”

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
REGULATIONS IN CHINA
The global economic crisis in 2008–2009, the significant decline
in the performance of firms, and the sky-high executive
compensation caused widespread discontent among the public.
The Chinese government issued series of policies to reduce

2

The use of the term contagion here is different from spillover effect studies
(Gleason et al., 2008), which focus on investor reactions to other firm behavior
and, hence, are about spillover of performance.
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SOEs, of which about 50,000 (33%) are owned by the central
government and the remainder owned by local governments.
The central government directly controls and manages 102 SOEs,
of which 66 are listed on domestic and/or international stock
exchanges.3 These SOEs produce one-fifth of China’s GDP, with
their assets accounting for about two-fifths, and their combined
profits accounting for three-fifths of all enterprises in China.
In the SOEs, executive performance assessment, tenure, and
promotion are determined by the government, and the political
future of executives is perceived to be more important than other
measures. As executive compensation is set by the government,
the pay-for-performance sensitivity is weak.
The government has significant and direct influences over
the managerial decisions in SOEs, especially with regards to the
appointment and termination of top executives. Executives of
the central SOEs hold dual roles as a corporate manager and
as a government official.4 The government plays a decisive role
in the development of executive pay packages. When a SOE
first submits an application, SASAC reviews it to determine its
executive pay. In such a process, executives can use their power
in SOEs to seek higher pay (Ke et al., 2012). For central SOEs,
the dual role of the executives of SOEs provides themselves the
government support, but it also leads to a misalignment of firm
performance and executive compensation because central SOEs
face relatively great pressure from the public and government
regulation (Li and Zhou, 2005), and managers in central SOEs
are more likely to be concerned with their political future than
the monetary pay.

the compensation gap between executives and employees. In
February 2009, the Ministry of Finance issued The Measures
on Executive Compensation of State-Owned and State Holding
Enterprises to regulate the executive pay of central SOEs in the
financial and insurance industry. It stipulates that the maximum
basic salary of CEOs of financial firms should not be more than
five times the average of employees on fixed salaries.
The most prevailing and significant reform incurred in
February 2013, when the National Development and Reform
Commission, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of
Human Resources and Social Security issued Several Opinions on
Further Reform of Income Distribution System to strengthen the
regulation on executive compensation and to enforce regulatory
policies on compensation and narrow the compensation gap
of SOEs owned by the central government. In particular, it
mandates that the growth rate of executive salary should be
lower than that of the average employees’ salary. In August 2014,
the compensation reform plan for central SOEs was approved,
which covered all executives, supervisors, and directors. The
reform involves 72 central SOEs. The executive compensation
package, which used to include only base salary and performance
salary, has now shifted to a structure consisting of a base
salary, a performance salary, and an incentive income. The
basic salary is based on the average employees’ salary in the
previous year, which should be twice as that of the average
employees’ salaries. The performance salary is based on the
outcome of an annual evaluation, which should be no more
than twice the basic salary. The incentive income is based on
an assessment of a variety of metrics, which should not exceed
30% of the total annual salary. In this study, we focus only on
the contagion effect of the compensation regulation in the second
phase because this regulation covers all industries and primarily
aims to reduce the compensation gap between executives and
employees of central SOEs.

Contagion Effect of Compensation
Regulation
The term “contagion” refers to imitational behavior whereby peer
firms begin redesigning compensation standards after observing
a target firm engaging in setting new compensation standards.
There are two categories: (a) information transferred through
communication channels between the prior adopter and the firm
and (b) information inferred from prior adopters belonging to
certain reference groups (Reppenhagen, 2010). Research on social
influence suggests that a variety of different mechanisms promote
the spread of behaviors (e.g., Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Some
of these are economically rational, while others are driven by
human psychology (Chiu et al., 2013). Early evidence on the
behavioral imitation and social learning theory was provided by
Bandura et al. (1961, 1963). The social norms explanation for
the behavior imitation suggests that when an individual identifies
with a social group, the behaviors of others in that social group
will have a larger influence on the observer’s social norms. Becker
and Murphy (2000) argue that behaviors are most likely subject to
social pressures from peers. Such a behavior can also be observed
in firms. For instance, managers’ perceptions can be influenced
by their superiors’ evaluation styles (Poe et al., 1991). Some
researchers propose that executive compensation practices reflect
symbolic considerations (Cadman and Carter, 2014), suggesting

LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The Effect of Regulations on
Compensation Gap
Empirical studies find that the compensation structure
is asymmetrical, as the marginal increase in executive
compensation with improved performance is greater than
the marginal decrease with decreasing executive performance.
CEOs receive additional bonuses when the firms’ performance
increases, but do not pay penalties for declining performance
(Jackson et al., 2008). However, few studies have specifically
investigated the effect of compensation regulation or its
contagion effect.
Most of the listed companies in China were transformed
from either central SOEs or local SOEs, where the government
dominates the ownership and control. Central SOEs are primarily
managed by the Development and Reform Commission of the
State Council, while local SOEs are under the charge of local
governments. As of July 2017, China has approximately 150,000
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https://www.export.gov/article?id=China-State-Owned-Enterprises
This is different from the situation when the CEO and board chairman are the
same person.
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executives of SOEs take the role of government officials, who
are in the administrative pyramid and thus more concerned
with both local revenue and their promotion opportunities
(Qian and Roland, 1998).
However, local SOEs and central SOEs could be different in
terms of practices, regulations, and implementations due to the
difference between central government and local governments,
if there is any. BrØDsgaard et al. (2017) find that in both SOEs
and their publicly listed subsidiaries, administrative experience
or political connections appear to increase the likelihood of
promotion. However, in the case of central SOE subsidiaries,
they find that leaders are more likely to be promoted based
on financial performance. Compensation regulation could be
an example. The 2013 compensation regulation is issued by
the central government on the compensation gap issues in
central SOEs, while local SOEs do not have to follow these
regulations immediately. While the central government provides
a framework of SOE reforms, officials of local governments have
to come up with the details of their own plans, which include
increasing public listings, improving SOE competitiveness,
and monitoring private investment in SOEs in non-regulated
industries (Haacke, 2014).
Due to political concerns, executives of local SOEs are most
likely to implement compensation regulations even though
they are not directly subject to the compensation regulations.
The salary regulations could guide executives of local SOEs,
which could, in turn, be developed by the local government
into detailed rules for a particular region. Although local
SOEs can freely choose their peer firms and set up executive
salary packages (DiPrete et al., 2010), they have incentives to
implement strategic benchmarking behavior in order to avoid
the external anger cost and strategically choose central SOEs as
their peers and benchmark the latter’s pay structure. Because
central SOE heads are “quasi-government officials” rather than
professional business executives, compensation regulations are
being implemented more strictly in central SOEs. Compared
with SOEs, the design of non-SOEs’ executive compensation
is more market-orientated. With better performance measures,
executives of non-SOEs are relatively highly qualified and thus
deserve higher compensation. Since non-SOEs usually operate
in highly competitive industries, their survival would depend on
the capabilities and efforts of their executives. Therefore, these
companies could increasingly rely on their pay systems to attract,
retain and motivate executive managers. Compared with local
SOEs, the compensation regulation of central SOEs would have
less impact on non-SOEs. Hence, we propose Hypothesis 1:

that firms with relative performance evaluation prefer visible and
well-established peers to facilitate the justification of their choices
to external constituencies.
According to the Constitution, the central government in
China has the power to manage and decide administrative,
economic and social fields. Provinces, autonomous regions and
provincial-level municipalities are subordinate to the central
government. Meanwhile, the central and local governments
have implemented the reform of administrative decentralization
and fiscal decentralization: local governments have relatively
independent economic decision-making power. On the other
hand, local governments can share fiscal revenues with the central
government. SOEs includes central SOEs and a large number of
local SOEs. Central SOEs are generally under the management
of the Development and Reform Commission of the State
Council and are also under management of local governments
(must be at the sub-provincial level or above to be indirectly
managed). Since 2003 the State-Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council has
been responsible for managing central SOEs. Each of these
provincial-level governments has its own SASAC, which oversees
provincial SOEs (local SOEs) (BrØDsgaard et al., 2017). Local
SOEs are directly managed by the local government, and the State
Council (the central government) generally does not manage
local SOEs. The appointment and removal of provincial officials
is also determined by the central government.
Within the hierarchy of government, there is a degree of
marketization, and local (provincial) governments have a degree
of de facto discretion (Zhou Y., 2014). Local governments not
only need to develop the local economy, but also take on
other responsibilities such as local employment, social stability,
and public welfare. The significant stake share of local SOEs
in most regions provides a platform for local government to
participate in economic activities directly. One of the vehicles is
that the government could appoint executives with government
backgrounds to the local SOEs.
Accordingly, corporate executives of SOEs are required to
report to government authorities on a regular basis and are
supervised through government audits and reviews. These
executives of SOEs are encouraged by the governmental
regulatory measures to focus on the overall interests of
stakeholders as well as their social functions. Therefore, the
executives of SOEs take the role of government officials, who
are in the administrative pyramid and thus more concerned
with both local revenue and their promotion opportunities (Qian
and Roland, 1998). SOEs are mainly to appoint executives,
and tournaments are effective institutions as SOE executives’
incentives (Zhou, 2007; Yang et al., 2013). SOE executive is in
a position of a relatively closed labor market, and there is a
huge gap between inside and outside of SOEs, senior executives
are normally not willing to choose to withdraw from existing
positions, and promotions are particularly important for SOE’s
executives (Zhou, 2004; Huang and Yu, 2009). More important,
executives at administrative levels can move horizontally or
vertically within the system easily. The pursuit of promotion
is mainly to obtain a higher control right, on-job expenditure,
and a wider range of resource allocation rights. Therefore, the

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

H1: The contagion effect of compensation regulation of
central SOEs is stronger in local SOEs than in non-SOEs.

Contagion Mechanisms
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) on social influence suggests that a
variety of mechanisms drive the spread of behaviors in a network.
Some of these are economically rational, while others are driven
by human psychology (Chiu et al., 2013). Rational observers
may follow the behavior of others based on direct observation
of the action or verbal communication about which action
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is preferred (Chiu et al., 2013). Companies often imitate the
practices of peer firms particularly in an uncertain environment.
For example, Kedia et al. (2015) point out that firms are more
likely to manage earnings after the public announcement of a
restatement by another firm in the same industry or the same
neighborhood. There is also strong evidence of on the usage
of relative performance evaluation use when peers are matched
on both industry and size (Albuquerque, 2009). Observers may
follow the behaviors of their peers based on direct observation
of the action or verbal communication on which action is
preferred. The reason why firms would be influenced by earlier
adopters is information-based, which means that prior adoptions
provide the information that is relevant to the firm’s decisionmaking process. The information can be transferred through
communication channels between a prior adopter and other
firms in the same industry. When faced with uncertainty about
an outcome, managers will seek ways to reduce that uncertainty
by gathering more information (Olsson, 2010). One source of
information is from the observation of other managers who are
confronted with similar problems. In performance assessment,
managers tend to compare themselves with peers performing
similar work (Major and Forcey, 1985). Firms also tend to
use benchmarking in CEO compensations (Bizjak et al., 2008;
Faulkender and Yang, 2010; Cadman and Carter, 2014).
The other reason why firms would be influenced by prior
adopters is spillover-related, which means that prior adoption
could change the net benefits of the decision-making of the late
adopters. For instance, the prior adoption by an industry rival
will increase the likelihood of a firm making a similar decision
(Francis and Michas, 2013). Companies in the same industry are
natural peers, as they face the same economic and competitive
pressures, and perhaps, might be followed by the same financial
analysts. Firms in the same industry are also benchmarked
against each other by investors and financial analysts. Since
companies in the same industry face similar economic pressures
and challenges, they are more likely to be interested in similar
accounting practices, such as similar mechanisms of earnings
management (Becker and Murphy, 2000; Chiu et al., 2013; Kedia
et al., 2015). Similar practices could also appear in the executive
pay policy. For instance, technology firms typically pay higher
compensation to their CEOs in total compensation and stock
options than non-technology firms (Dunn et al., 2019).
Firms in the same industry likely face a similar set of intrinsic
propensities to adopt; thus, adopting the practice might lead to
a similar outcome. The consequences of prior adoptions in the
same industry are likely to be especially salient to the firm due to
its familiarity with peers in the same industry. Also, the number
of adoptions in the same industry is relevant if manager underweigh their private information signal in the presence of the
cumulative influence of other managers’ decisions (Bikhchandani
et al., 1992; Reppenhagen, 2010). Therefore, companies in the
peer selection process would consider the effect of the industry in
performance evaluations (Albuquerque, 2009; Gong et al., 2011).
Following the same line of argument, we would expect that the
local SOEs in the same industry as central SOEs would be more
likely to follow the compensation regulations. Hence, we propose
Hypothesis 2:

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Hypothesis 2: The contagion effect of compensation
regulation is stronger for SOEs in the same industry than
in other industries.
Migrants from the same area show that individual decisions
can be influenced by the same geopolitical relationship (Kelly
and Grada, 2000). Firms located in the same geographical
area can also be regarded as peers. Several researchers find
that geographical proximity is associated with informational
advantages in portfolio decisions (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001)
and forecasting accuracy of analysts (Malloy, 2005). Furthermore,
companies in the same geographical area make them aware
of each other’s business activities. Firms located in the same
geographical area belong to diverse industries, face different
economic challenges, and may find several practices of their peers
to be less relevant to their business. Therefore, contagion in
geographical peers is more likely to arise from learning about the
costs of making some decisions. The “most common finding in
diffusion research is that spatially proximate actors influence each
other” (Strang and Soule, 1998, p. 245). Geographical proximity
can enable executives to gather more information about another
firm’s operations and practices, which can occur due to more
exposure to the local press. Hence, we propose Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: The contagion effect of the compensation
regulation is stronger for SOEs in the same region than in
other regions.

MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DATA
Model Specifications
Model (1) is used to examine the contagion effect of
compensation regulation for central SOEs on local SOEs.
GAP = α + β1 LocalSOE + β2 LocalSOE∗Reg + β3 Reg
+β4 Duality + β5 Stakeholder + β6 Boardsize + β7 IndBoard
+β8 Growth + β9 Size + β10 Lev + β11 LROA
+β12 Year Dummies + β13 Industry Dummies
+β14 Firm Fixed Effects + ε

(1)

where the dependent variable GAP5 is measured by GAPD and
GAPR. GAPD is the logarithm of the difference between average
executive compensation and average employee compensation.
GAPR is the logarithm of the ratio of average executive
compensation to average employee compensation. Average
5

Hambrick and Siegel (1997) introduce a vertical and horizontal pay dispersion
measurements. Vertical pay dispersion captured by the CEO pay divided by the
average pay of all level executives. Horizontal pay dispersion is captured by the
coefficient of variation of pay for second-level executives. Lin et al. (2003) point
that pay gap among executive team refer to the gap between CEO pay and other
executive pay, and it measured by the absolute value of pay gap, absolute value of
average CEO pay mins average non-CEO pay and absolute value of average CEO
pay divided by average non-CEO pay. Kale et al. (2009) summed total, short-term
and long-term (including shares) gap compensation to capture pay dispersion and
calculate as log (total gap) = log (total compensation of CEO - median value of
total compensation of all VPs in the firm-year).
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one central SOE in the industry. Province is an indicator variable
coded as one if there is at least one central SOE in the same
province. The definitions of control and other variables are the
same as described as earlier. According to Hypothesis 2 and
Hypothesis 3, we expect that the coefficient of the interactive
terms (Affected∗ Reg and Province∗ Reg), β2 , is positive. To address
possible standard errors cluster issue, we control for firm fixed
effect, year fixed effect and industry fixed effect in the regressions.

executive compensation is defined as the disclosed total
compensation of the top three executives divided by three.
Average employee compensation is defined as the total employee
salary expense (after deducting the top three executive’s salaries)
divided by the number of average employees (after deducting the
three top executives).6 Employee salary expense is calculated as
the total employee salaries payable at the end of the period minus
the employee salaries payable at the beginning of the period plus
cash paid to employees in the current period. Reg is a dummy for
the post-regulation period, coded as one if the observation is from
the post-regulation period and zero otherwise. According to our
first hypothesis, we expect β2 to be negative.
Consistent with prior studies, we also include control variables
such as Duality, Stakeholder, Boardsize, IndBoard, Size, Growth,
LROA, and dummies for industry sectors. We use the log of
total assets (Size) control for firm size because CEOs of larger
companies likely receive higher compensation (Dhole et al.,
2015). As sales growth is often associated with managers’ pay
raises, we include Growth and LROA, defined as the growth rate
of operating income and the previous year’s ROA, respectively.
We include Duality, Stakeholder, Boardsize, and IndBoard in
Model (1) because Sapp (2008) points out that corporate
governance features are related to executive compensations.
For instance, the literature has documented empirically the
effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship
between executive compensation and firm performance after the
adoption of corporate governance (e.g., Chalevas, 2011). We
include industry dummy variables High-Tech industry, Regulated
industry, and Finance industry as compensations can vary in
different sectors.
Model (2) and Model (3) are used to examine the contagion
mechanism of compensation regulation from central SOEs
to local SOEs via the same industry and the same region,
respectively.

Data Collection
Following the requirements of the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC), publicly listed firms started to disclose
compensation information on top executives in 2001. Further,
starting in 2005, firms were required to disclose separate
information on their CEO, board chairman and other executives.
Since our focus is on the 2013 compensation regulation, we
use the year 2013 as an event year and collect data for the
3 years before and 3 years after 2013. Initially, we select a
sample of 91 central SOEs in 2013 and identify 62 local SOEs
and 70 non-SOEs using performance score matching approach
based Duality, Stakeholder, Boardsize, IndBoard, Growth, LROA,
Size, Lev, High-Tech industry, Regulated industry, and Finance
industry. The sample selection process also includes: (1) removal
of observations with missing data; (2) removal of observations
of firms whose executives serve less than 1 year; (3) removal of
observations in 2013 to facilitate the comparison between the
periods before and after the compensation regulation. The final
sample consist of 1,208 observations, including 456 observations
for central SOEs, 402 observations for local SOEs, and 350
observations for non-SOEs. We obtain executive compensation
data from firms’ annual reports and financial and corporate
governance data from the WIND and CSMAR databases. To
eliminate the effects of extreme values, we winsorize the data at
the 1 and 99% for each continuous variable. The sample selection
process is summarized in Table 1, Panel A.

GAP = α + β1 Affected + β2 Affected∗Reg + β3 Reg + β4 Duality
+β5 Stakeholder + β6 Boardsize + β7 IndBoard + β8 Growth
+β9 Size + β10 Lev + β11 LROA + β12 Year Dummies
+β13 Industry Dummies + β14 Firm Fixed Effects + ε

Descriptive Statistics and Correlation
Matrix

(2)

The descriptive statistics are presented in Panel B of Table 1.
The mean (median) of GAPR is 1.997 (1.931), indicating that
on average the compensation ratio of top executive to the
average employee during our sample period is 7.367 (though
the median is 6.896). The average (median) of GAPD is 12.960
(12.993), indicating that on average the compensation difference
between top executives and employees during our sample period
is 425,066 (the median is 178,617). About 25.7% observations
are on central SOEs and 41% observations on local SOEs; 33.4%
observations are from non-SOEs. The sample firms have an
average (median) leverage of 52.2% (53.6%). As for the corporate
governance features, these firms also have an average (median)
logarithm of the number of board members 2.296 (2.303),
suggesting that on average there are ten members on board
(median is 10). Approximately 37.6% of board members are
independent and roughly 11.6% of all observations are from firms
with a CEO-chairman duality.

GAP = α + β1 Province + β2 Province∗Reg + β3 Reg + β4 Duality
+β5 Stakeholder + β6 Boardsize + β7 IndBoard + β8 Growth
+β9 Size + β10 Lev + β11 LROA + β12 Year Dummies
+β13 Industry Dummies + β14 Firm Fixed Effects + ε

(3)

where the dependent variable GAP is measured by GAPD and
GAPR, and the test variables are Affected, Province and Reg.
Affected is an indicator variable coded as one if there is at least
6

According to the 2013 compensation regulation, executives are defined as
CEO/President, Vice President, CFO, Chairman of the Board of Directors, and/or
other officials defined in the Charters of the company while average employees are
defined as employees other than executives mentioned above.
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TABLE 1 | Sample selection and descriptive statistics.
Panel A: sample selection
Central SOEs

91 firms

Non-SOEs identified via Performance Score Matching with Central SOEs

62 firms

Local SOEs identified via Performance Score Matching with Central SOEs

70 firms

Sample firms with data available for analyses

211 firms

Observations in 2010–2016 (excluding 2013)

1208 observations

Including: Central SOEs

456 observations

Local SOEs

402 observations

Non-SOEs

350 observations

Panel B: Descriptive statistics for pooled sample
N

Minimum

Std. dev.

Mean

Maximum

Median

GAPD

1208

7.283

0.978

12.960

15.169

12.993

GAPR

1208

0.006

0.918

1.997

4.959

1.931

CentralSOE

1208

0

0.437

0.257

1

0

LocalSOE

1208

0

0.492

0.410

1

0

NonSOE

1208

0

0.472

0.334

1

0

Stakeholder

1208

0.000

0.135

0.167

0.562

0.135

Duality

1208

0

0.320

0.116

1

0

Boardsize

1208

1.792

0.176

2.296

2.773

2.303

IndBoard

1208

0.308

0.056

0.376

0.571

0.364

Size

1208

19.084

1.476

22.764

27.248

22.581

LROA

1208

–0.217

0.059

0.038

0.211

0.035

Growth

1208

–0.637

0.753

0.229

5.948

0.101

Lev

1208

0.047

0.206

0.522

1.112

0.536

Panel C: Descriptive statistics for Sub-sample
Central SOEs N = 456

Local SOEs N = 402

Non-SOEs N = 350

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

GAPD

12.966

0.845

12.824

1.042

13.110

1.043

GAPR

1.945

0.814

1.913

0.920

2.162

1.019

Stakeholder

0.180

0.137

0.187

0.140

0.126

0.119

Duality

0.086

0.280

0.092

0.289

0.183

0.387

Boardsize

2.319

0.177

2.302

0.176

2.260

0.169

IndBoard

0.374

0.057

0.378

0.059

0.375

0.052

Size

22.905

1.730

22.755

1.248

22.591

1.337

LROA

0.034

0.064

0.036

0.055

0.045

0.058

Growth

0.195

0.697

0.238

0.823

0.264

0.738

Lev

0.547

0.206

0.514

0.201

0.500

0.210

Panel D: Average Compensation Gaps in Central SOEs, Local SOEs, and Non-SOEs
Variable

GAPD

GAPR

Period

Central
SOEs

Local
SOEs

Non-SOEs

Central SOEs Vs. Local
SOEs (Z-test)

Central SOEs Vs.
Non-SOEs (Z-test)

Local SOEs Vs.
Non-SOEs (Z-test)

2010–2012

12.863

12.730

12.815

5.308**

1.317

1.150

2014–2016

13.068

12.920

13.429

2.236

9.733***

39.159***

z-test

6.885***

8.594***

29.105***

2010–2012

2.020

1.904

2.034

2.614

0.000

1.762

2014–2016

1.869

1.922

2.299

0.084

17.358***

25.026***

z-test

3.102*

0.139

4.879**

*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level (2-tailed).
We apply Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test to compare different nature of the enterprise samples.
See Appendix 1 for the definitions of the variables.
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TABLE 2 | Pearson correlation coefficients.
GAPD

GAPR

CentralSOE

LocalSOE

NonSOE

Stakeholder

Duality

Boardsize

IndBoard

Size

LROA

GROWTH

GAPD

1

GAPR

0.356

1

CentralSOE

–0.045

–0.059**

1

LocalSOE

–0.010

–0.045

–0.490***

1

NonSOE

0.053*

0.101***

–0.416***

–0.590***

1

Stakeholder

–0.018

–0.065**

0.1061***

0.031

–0.131***

1

Duality

0.031

0.128***

–0.059**

0.009

0.046

–0.091***

1

Boardsize

–0.086***

0.013

0.089***

0.091***

–0.178***

0.053*

–0.133***

1

IndBoard

0.005

–0.026

0.007

0.004

–0.011

0.038

0.106***

–0.373***

1

Size

–0.035

0.073**

0.112***

0.033

–0.139***

0.284***

–0.033

0.289***

0.016

1

LROA

0.037

0.037

–0.040

0.012

0.024

0.037

0.068**

–0.004

–0.023

0.013

1

Growth

0.119***

0.0377

–0.0803***

–0.010

0.085***

0.026

0.052*

–0.045

–0.003

0.022

–0.026

1

Lev

–0.041

–0.029

0.081***

0.034

–0.110***

0.029

–0.068**

0.053*

0.006

0.381

–0.151

–0.037

Lev

1

See Appendix 1 for the definitions of the variables.
*, **, *** indicate, respectively, significant level at the 10, 5, and 1% level.

The descriptive statistics for the PSM sub-samples are
presented in Panel C of Table 1. For the central SOEs, local SOEs,
and non-SOEs sample firms, the mean of GAPR is 1.945, 1.913,
and 2.162, respectively, indicating that on average the ratio of
top executive pay to the average employee during our sample
period is 6.994, 6.773, and 8.688 for the central SOEs, local SOEs,
and non-SOEs, respectively.7 For the central SOEs, local SOEs,
and non-SOEs, the average GAPD is 12.966, 12.824, and 13.110,
respectively, indicating that on average the compensation amount
difference between top executives and the average employees
during our sample period is RMB 427,624, 371,015, and 493,856,
respectively. The central SOEs, local SOEs, and non-SOEs have
an average leverage of 54.7, 51.4, and 50%, respectively, and
an average operating income growth of 19.5, 23.8, and 26.4%,
respectively. The average LROA is 3.4, 3.6, and 4.5% in central
SOEs, local SOEs and non-SOEs subsamples, respectively. As for
the corporate governance features, the average logarithm of board
size is 2.319, 2.302, and 2.260 for these central SOEs, local SOEs,
and non-SOE firms, respectively, suggesting that on average there
are about ten members on board for all these sample firms. The
central SOEs, local SOEs, and non-SOE firms have an average
37.4, 37.8, and 37.5% independent board members, respectively.
Non-SOEs sub-sample shows a higher percentage of firms with
CEO-chairman duality (18.3%) than the central SOEs (8.6%) and
local SOEs (9.2%) subsamples.
Panel D of Table 1 presents the results of a comparative
analysis of compensation gaps between central SOEs, local SOEs,
and non-SOEs. We use the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney)
test to compare differences in variables among the enterprise
samples. During 2010–2012, the mean of GAPD (GAPR) is
12.863 (2.020) for central SOEs, 12.730 (1.904) for local SOEs,
and 12.815 (2.034) for non-SOEs, indicating that before the
regulations, the average compensation difference between top
executives and employees was 385,771 (7.538), 337,729 (6.713),

and 367,691 (7.645) in central SOEs, local SOEs, and non-SOEs.
During 2014–2016, the mean of GAPD (GAPR) was 13.068
(1.869) for central SOEs, 12.920 (1.922) for local SOEs and 13.429
(2.299) for non-SOEs, indicating that after the regulations, the
average compensation difference between top executives and
employees (the average ratio of top executive pay to the average
employee) was 473,544 (6.482), 408,399 (6.835), and 679,424
(9.964). These findings indicate that, in both the pre-adoption
and post-adoption periods, the three groups are different from
each other in their compensation gap, as measured by GAPD
and GAPR.
Table 2 presents Pearson’s correlations among the variables
used in the regression analyses of compensation regulation
and compensation gap. The variables GAPD and GAPR are
significantly and positively correlated to each other with a
coefficient on 0.356. Central SOE is negatively correlated to GAPR
with a correlation of –0.059 but not significantly correlated with
GAPD. Non-SOE is positively correlated with GAPD and GAPR
with a correlation coefficient of 0.053 and 0.101, respectively. All
variables have a correlation coefficient of less than 0.400. We also
compute variance inflation factors (VIF), all of which are under
three. Thus, there are no serious multicollinearity problems in
this study.

EMPIRICAL TESTS
Contagion Effect of Compensation
Regulation
In this section, we examine whether the regulation on executive
compensation in central SOEs is contagious to local SOEs and
non-SOEs. Table 3 presents the results of the contagion effect
of compensation regulation on local SOEs and non-SOEs. The
first two columns show the contagion effect of compensation
regulation on local-SOEs. The results show that the coefficient
on Reg is positive and statistically significant when GAPD is
used as a proxy for compensation gap, while it is negative and

7

Because we use the PSM approach, the subsamples for local SOEs, and non-SOEs
we use here are matched samples. Therefore. the descriptive statistics reported here
are not for the population of local SOEs and non-SOEs during the same period.
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TABLE 3 | The contagion effect of compensation regulations.
Central vs. Local SOEs
Variables

GAPD

Con
Reg
LocalSOE
LocalSOE* Reg

Local Vs. Non-SOEs

GAPR

GAPD

GAPR

GAPD

7.57***

–1.87

(5.41)

(–1.05)

6.97***

–3.02*

7.50***

–0.12

(5.24)

(–1.81)

(4.33)

(–0.05)

0.28***

–0.36***

0.52***

–0.01

0.27*

0.10

(3.50)

(–3.56)

(5.59)

(–0.10)

(1.75)

(0.46)

–0.07

–0.10

0.13*

0.13

(–0.98)

(–1.22)

(1.70)

(1.29)

–0.05

0.15

–0.35***

–0.26***

(–0.71)

(1.63)

(–4.34)

(–2.56)

AffectedInd
AffectedInd*Reg
Stakeholder
Duality
Boardsize
IndBoard
Size
LROA
Growth

Non-SOEs
GAPR

–0.15

–0.27

(–0.98)

(–1.22)

0.30*

0.62**

(1.67)

(2.45)

–0.71**

–0.35

–0.32

0.01

0.35

0.59

(–2.40)

(–0.93)

(–1.03)

(0.02)

(0.65)

(0.79)

0.14

0.11

0.05

–0.07

-0.004

–0.24

(1.51)

(0.88)

(0.61)

(–0.66)

(–0.04)

(–1.54)

0.25

0.37

0.25

0.53

0.17

0.25

(1.03)

(1.17)

(0.92)

(1.57)

(0.46)

(0.47)

–0.53

0.16

–0.76

0.65

–0.22

0.20

(–0.93)

(0.23)

(–1.17)

(0.79)

(–0.22)

(0.14)

0.23***

0.14**

0.28***

0.18***

0.28***

0.11

(4.35)

(2.11)

(5.67)

(2.93)

(4.37)

(1.23)

0.89***

0.56

1.66***

0.89*

0.07

–0.02

(2.66)

(1.33)

(4.10)

(1.74)

(0.13)

(–0.02)

–0.02

0.05

–0.08***

0.004

–0.05

–0.01

(–0.58)

(1.61)

(–2.90)

(0.12)

(–1.17)

(–0.10)

–0.67***

–0.66***

–0.91***

–0.62**

–0.88***

–0.26

(–3.86)

(–3.00)

(–4.57)

(–2.48)

(–3.29)

(–0.66)

Year

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Industry

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

F

6.34

4.45

12.55

5.06

11.64

2.91

0.3011

0.1275

0.1940

0.0911

0.1214

0.0009

858

858

752

752

350

350

Lev

R-squared
Samples

We test the contagion effect from central SOEs to local SOEs and non-SOEs in Table 3, using a sample of 456 observations on central SOEs, 402 observations on local
SOEs, and 350 observations on non-SOEs.
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level (2-tailed).
See Appendix 1 for the definitions of the variables.

statistically significant when GAPR is used, indicating that the
compensation regulation did reduce the ratio of executive pay
to the average employee but not the dollar amount difference
between them. In addition, the coefficient on LocalSOE∗ Reg is
statistically insignificant regardless whether compensation gap is
measured by GAPD or GAPR. Thus, there is no difference in the
effect of compensation regulation policy between central SOEs
and local SOEs, which suggests that while the local SOEs are not
the subject of the compensation regulation, the indirect effect
they experience is the same as the central SOEs.
The middle two columns show the contagion effect of
compensation regulation on local SOEs using a PSM matched
sample of both local SOEs and non-SOEs. The results show
that the coefficient on Reg is positive and statistically significant
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when GAPD is used as a proxy for compensation gap, while
it is statistically insignificant when GAPR is used. However,
the results show that the coefficient on Local SOE ∗ Reg is
negative–the coefficient on LocalSOE ∗ Reg (β = –0.35, t = –4.34,
p < 0.01) is significantly negative when GAPD is used as
a measure of compensation gap, and it is also significantly
negative (β = –0.26, t = –2.56, p < 0.01) when GAPD is used
to measure the compensation gap. Thus, the results suggest
that the compensation regulation policy on central SOEs has
significantly more contagion effects on the compensation gap
in local state-owned enterprises than non-SOEs. Compensation
regulation announced by the State Council is enforced more
strictly in the central SOEs and it is expected to have an impact
on the central SOE executive compensation, which in turn
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TABLE 5 | Intra-region contagion mechanism in SOEs.

TABLE 4 | Intra-industry contagion mechanism in SOEs.
Central Vs. Local-SOEs
Variable
con
Reg
Affected
Affected*Reg
Stakeholder
Duality
Boardsize
IndBoard
Size
LROA
Growth
Lev
Year

GAPD

GAPR

7.63***

–1.77

(5.41)

(–1.00)

0.28***

–0.39***

(3.29)

(–3.65)

0.04

-0.10

(0.50)

(–1.13)

–0.03

0.18*

(–0.40)

(1.78)

–0.74**

–0.33

(–2.49)

(–0.88)

0.13

0.10

(1.41)

(0.83)

0.25

0.34

(1.02)

(1.08)

–0.53

0.12

(–0.93)

(0.16)

0.23***

0.14**

(4.27)

(2.09)

0.87***

0.56

(2.60)

(1.33)

Variable

GAPD

con

7.59***

–1.74

(5.38)

(–0.98)

0.28***

–0.38***

(3.37)

(–3.56)

Reg
Province
Province*Reg
Stakeholder
Duality
Boardsize
IndBoard
Size
LROA
Growth

–0.08

(0.60)

(–0.85)

–0.04

0.16

(–0.52)

(1.60)

–0.74**

–0.36

(–2.48)

(–0.96)

0.13

0.10

(1.41)

(0.83)

0.25

0.34

(1.01)

(1.09)

–0.53

0.11

(–0.92)

(0.15)

0.23***

0.14**

(4.28)

(2.06)

0.87***

0.54

(2.60)

(1.28)

–0.01

0.05

(–0.55)

(1.53)

–0.69***

–0.64***

(–3.95)

(–2.94)
Incl.

–0.01

0.05
(1.56)

–0.68***

–0.65***

Year

Incl.

(–3.93)

(–2.97)

Industry

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

F

6.14

4.44

0.2931

0.1248

858

858

Lev

Incl.

Incl.

R-squared

F

6.13

4.48

observations

0.2910

0.1311

858

858

Observations

0.04

(–0.53)

Industry
R-squared

GAPR

We test intra-region contagion mechanism in SOEs in Table 5, using sample of 402
observations on local SOEs and 456 observations on central SOEs.
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level (2-tailed).
See Appendix 1 for the definitions of variables.

We test intra-industry contagion mechanism in SOEs in Table 4, using sample of
402 observations on local SOEs and 456 observations on central SOEs.
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level (2-tailed).
See Appendix 1 for the definitions of variables.

industry. The results show that the coefficient on Reg is positive
and significant when GAPD is used as a proxy for compensation
gap while it is insignificant when GAPR is used, indicating
that for non-SOEs the compensation regulation itself does not
show any effects to reduce the ratio of executive pay to the
average employee or the dollar amount difference between them.
Instead, the dollar amount difference between executives and
average employees are increased over the sample period. Central
SOEs are paying more attention on GAPR. The gap increase
in the same industry after regulation for Non-SOEs indicating
the regulation has no impact on non-SOEs. Both columns show
that the coefficient on AffectedInd∗ Reg is positive and significant
when GAPD and GAPR are used as a proxy for compensation
gap, respectively (β = 0.30, t = 1.67, p < 0.1; β = 0.62, t = 2.45,
p < 0.05, respectively). Thus, we find that the compensation
regulation policy on central SOEs has no contagion effects on the
compensation gap in non-SOEs in terms of reducing the ratio
of executive pay to the average employee or the dollar amount
difference between top executives and employees. We do not find
any evidence that the compensation regulation affects the gap

affect the pay gap captured by GAPD. Although local SOEs
can freely choose their peer firms and set up executive salary
packages (DiPrete et al., 2010), they have political incentives to
strategically choose central SOEs as their peers and benchmark
the latter’s pay structure. Therefore, it shows negative association
of Reg on GAPD. The results are consistent with our expectation
that compared with local SOEs, the compensation regulation
on central SOEs would have little impact on non-SOEs. The
last two columns show whether there is a contagion effect of
compensation regulation on non-SOEs. We examine whether
the non-SOEs within the same industry as the central SOEs
are likely affected by the compensation regulations than other
non-SOEs from other industries. The methodology we applied is
still DID model. AffectedInd∗ Reg is the interaction term between
AffectedInd and Reg, where Reg is a dummy variable which is
equal to 1 if the observation is from the post-regulation period,
and 0 otherwise. AffectedInd is capturing whether there is at
least one central enterprise included in the regulation in the
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between executive compensation and employee compensation
in non-SOEs within the same industry. However, executives’
compensation in non-SOEs dramatically increased after 2013,
therefore, we can see a significantly positive coefficient.

and forecasting accuracy of analysts (Malloy, 2005). Thus,
geographical proximity could enable a local SOE company to
learn about another firm’s compensation packages including
any adjustments in response to the compensation regulations
on central SOEs.

Contagion Mechanism via Industry and
Region

Additional Test: Compensation
Regulation and Firm Performance

In this section, we examine the contagion mechanism of
compensation regulation among SOEs, particularly, whether the
contagion effect of compensation regulation is more significant
in the same industry or region as central SOEs who are directly
subject to the regulations. We test intra-industry contagion
mechanism in SOEs in Table 4, using sample of 402 observations
on local SOEs and 456 observations on central SOEs. Table 4
shows whether the contagion effect of compensation regulation
is more significant in the same industry as central SOEs who
are directly subject to the regulations. The results show that
the coefficient on Reg is positive and significant (β = 0.28,
t = 3.29, p < 0.01) when GAPD is used as a proxy for
compensation gap while it is negative and significant (β = –0.39,
t = –3.65, p < 0.01) when GAPR is used, indicating that the
compensation regulation did reduce the ratio of executive pay
to the average employee but not the dollar amount difference
between executives and average employees, which indicating the
regulation has negative association on the pay gap measured by
GAPR. This impact is incrementally targeting central SOEs. The
results also show that the coefficient on Affected∗ Reg (β = 0.18,
t = 1.78, p < 0.10) is positive and significant when using GAPR
to measure compensation gap but not significant when using
GAPD. Relatively speaking, it indeed has impact on local SOEs
but the level of pay gap decrease is smaller than central SOEs
pay gap decrease. Therefore, it shows a positive coefficient on
Affected∗ Reg. The positive sign suggests that the local SOEs
have less reductions in the ratio of executive pay to the average
employee while compared with central SOEs. The significant sign
suggests that the contagion effect of executive pay regulations
within the same industry is more obvious when compared with
cross-industry. This finding is consistent with the literature,
e.g., firms tend to use benchmarking in CEO compensations
(Faulkender and Yang, 2010; Cadman and Carter, 2014) by
indicating that local SOEs in the same industry as the regulated
central SOEs might have incentives to choose central SOEs as
their peers (strategically benchmarking).
Table 5 shows whether the contagion effect of compensation
regulation is more significant in the same region as central
SOEs who are directly subject to the regulations. When GAPD
and GAPR are used to proxy for the compensation gap, the
coefficients on Province∗ Reg are not significant. These results
indicate that after the compensation regulations, compared with
central SOEs, local SOEs have a similar compensation difference
between executives and employees, and a lower ratio of executive
pay to the average employee. Moreover, after the compensation
regulations, compared with central SOEs, local SOEs have
significantly lower compensation growth rate for executives than
for employees. These results confirm other researchers’ findings
that geographical proximity is associated with informational
advantages in portfolio decisions (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001)
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

In this section, we investigate whether the compensation
regulation has economic consequences. The agency-based theory
generally supports a positive relationship between executive
compensation and firm performance (Nourayi and Mintz,
2008; Ke et al., 2012). The pay-for-performance setting varies
with different data, institutions, and model specifications. For
instance, Kim and Leung (2007) conclude that compensation
incentives cannot resolve agency problems and thus there is
a need to have adequate corporate governance mechanisms in
place. Different from these prior studies, we investigate whether
the government regulation on compensation gap. Following
Cunat and Guadalupe (2009), we estimate the effect of the
compensation regulation on performance as below:
Performance = α + β1 LocalSOE + β2 LocalSOE∗Reg + β3 Reg
+β4 Duality + β5 Stakeholder + β6 Boardsize
+β7 IndBoard + β8 LnRev + β9 Size + β10 Lev
+β11 Year Dummies + β12 Year Dummies
+β13 Firm Fixed Effects + ε

(4)

Table 6 shows the results of the compensation regulation on
firm performance with ROE or ROA as a dependent variable
for a pooled sample with central SOEs, local SOEs, and nonSOEs. It is divided into four columns for analysis, of which
the first column mainly analyses Central SOEs; the second
column mainly analyses Local SOEs; the third column mainly
analyses Non-SOEs. The fourth column mainly takes Non-SOEs
as the control to analyze the influence of SOEs. The results
show that the pooled sample firms, after the compensation
regulations, experienced a reduced firm performance as indicated
by the negative coefficients on Reg. When ROE is used as
a performance measure, the coefficients on CentralSOE∗ Reg,
LocalSOE∗ Reg, and NonSOE∗ Reg are statistically insignificant in
all the columns. When ROA is used as a performance measure,
the same results are presented in all the columns. The results
could be caused by the pooled sample, as it includes three
different types of firms – central SOEs, local SOEs, and nonSOEs.
To further investigate whether the results above are caused by
the pooled sample, we separately run the regressions for different
sub-samples. Table 7 shows the results of the compensation
regulation on firm performance with ROE or ROA as a dependent
variable for central SOEs, local SOEs and non-SOEs, separately.
When ROE is used as a performance measure, the coefficient on
Reg is –0.51 (t = –1.18, p > 0.1), –0.40 (t = –2.43, p < 0.05),
–0.33 (t = –0.33, p > 0.1) for central SOEs, local SOEs, and
non-SOEs, respectively. When ROA is used as a performance
11
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TABLE 6 | Additional test of the effect of compensation regulation on performance.
Variable
Reg
CentralSOE

ROE
–0.76***

–0.58

–0.13

–0.96***

–0.03***

–0.03***

–0.02***

–0.94***

(–1.94)

(–1.51)

(–1.11)

(–2.09)

(–3.75)

(–3.65)

(–3.22)

(–3.68)

0.05

0.15

-0.002

–0.01

(0.13)

(0.32)

(–0.26)

(–0.64)

LocalSOE

0.13

0.18

-0.004

–0.01

(0.39)

(0.45)

(–0.53)

(–0.80)

NonSOE
centralSOE* Reg

ROA

–0.13

0.01

(–0.37)

(0.90)

0.50

0.73

0.01

0.01

(1.21)

(1.51)

(0.80)

(1.16)

LocalSOE* Reg

0.08

0.38

0.003

0.01

(0.22)

(0.84)

(0.43)

(0.95)

NonSOE* Reg

-0.50

–0.01

(–1.28)

(–1.19)

Control variables

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Observations

1208

1208

1208

1208

1208

1208

1208

1208

We test the compensation regulation on firm performance in Table 6, using a pooled sample of 456 observations on central SOEs, 402 observations on local SOEs, and
350 observations on non-SOEs.
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level (2-tailed).
See Appendix 1 for the definitions of the variables.

TABLE 7 | Additional test using sub-samples:compensation regulation on performance.
Variable

Central SOEs
ROE

con
Reg
Stakeholder
Duality
Boardsize
IndBoard
Size
LROA
Growth
Lev
F
R-squared
Observations

Local SOEs

Non-SOEs

ROA

ROE

ROA

ROE

ROA

3.56

0.01

–8.68***

–1.49***

–78.87***

–0.01

(0.44)

(0.03)

(–2.82)

(–5.45)

(–5.03)

(–0.06)

–0.51

–0.03*

–0.40**

–0.08***

–0.33

–0.01

(–1.18)

(–1.84)

(–2.43)

(–5.58)

(–0.33)

(–0.66)

0.40

–0.13*

–0.42

0.03

8.73*

0.08

(0.19)

(–1.93)

(–0.76)

(0.55)

(1.82)

(1.19)

–0.12

–0.01

–0.004

–0.01

1.16

–0.02

(–0.19)

(–0.42)

(–0.02)

(–0.37)

(1.13)

(1.63)

–1.01

0.02

0.71

-0.01

4.86

-0.01

(–0.66)

(0.33)

(1.32)

(–0.22)

(1.40)

(–0.15)

–0.32

–0.01

–2.67**

–0.02

10.07

0.01

(–0.09)

(–0.11)

(–2.26)

(–0.22)

(1.06)

(0.07)
0.003

–0.10

0.002

0.34***

0.07***

3.11***

(–0.31)

(0.18)

(2.89)

(6.47)

(5.38)

(0.30)

–1.17

0.07

–1.31

0.16**

–8.64*

0.21***

(–0.62)

(1.22)

(–1.63)

(2.20)

(–1.69)

(2.94)

0.37**

0.02***

0.08

0.003

0.74**

0.01**

(2.16)

(3.90)

(1.55)

(0.58)

(2.00)

(2.13)

1.93*

–0.04

0.001

–0.14***

–11.51***

–0.09**

(1.90)

(–1.24)

(0.00)

(–3.70)

(–4.49)

(–2.50)

1.19

2.02

2.21

6.19

4.52

2.81

0.0003

0.0548

0.0027

0.0325

0.0682

0.2000

456

456

402

402

350

350

We test the compensation regulation on firm performance in Table 7, using separate sub-samples of 456 observations on central SOEs, 402 observations on local SOEs,
and 350 observations on non-SOEs.
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level (2-tailed).
See Appendix 1 for the definitions of the variables.
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TABLE 8 | Robustness test using a pooled sample.
Variables
con
Reg
CentralSOE

GAPD

GAPR

6.97***

6.84***

7.36***

7.24***

–2.15

–2.54*

–1.80

–1.86

(6.66)

(6.58)

(7.01)

(6.95)

(–1.59)

(–1.88)

(–1.32)

(–1.37)

0.37***

0.39***

0.24***

0.54***

–0.14

–0.23***

–0.34***

–0.001

(5.54)

(5.95)

(3.83)

(6.94)

(–1.58)

(–2.73)

(–1.58)

(–0.01)

0.03

0.09

0.16*

(0.43)

(1.16)

(1.80)

LocalSOE

0.24**
(2.42)

0.06

0.10

0.03

0.15*

(0.96)

(1.50)

(0.44)

(1.68)

NonSOE

–0.10

–0.20**

(–1.56)
CentralSOE* Reg

(–2.44)

–0.11

–0.29***

–0.30***

(–1.61)

(–3.54)

(–3.32)

LocalSOE* Reg

–0.18***
(–2.85)

NonSOE* Reg

–0.44***
(–4.15)

–0.30***

–0.04

(–4.17)

(–0.53)

0.30***

Duality
Boardsize
IndBoard
Size
LROA
Growth

(–2.54)
0.32***

(4.50)
Stakeholder

–0.24**

(3.69)

–0.49*

–0.48*

–0.43*

–0.43*

–0.23

–0.27

–0.20

–0.19

(-1.94)

(–1.88)

(–1.72)

(–1.72)

(–0.70)

(–0.81)

(–0.60)

(–0.58)

0.09

0.10

0.09

0.09

–0.03

–0.02

–0.04

–0.04

(1.28)

(1.37)

(1.23)

(1.23)

(–0.34)

(–0.24)

(–0.42)

(–0.45)

0.30

0.24

0.24

0.24

0.39

0.35

0.30

0.33

(1.47)

(1.20)

(1.20)

(1.18)

(1.48)

(1.33)

(1.13)

(1.25)

–0.57

–0.56

–0.58

–0.58

0.12

0.14

0.09

0.09

(–1.15)

(–1.14)

(–1.19)

(–1.19)

(0.19)

(0.21)

(0.14)

(0.14)

0.27***

0.28***

0.26***

0.26***

0.16***

0.19***

0.17***

0.16***

(6.80)

(7.20)

(6.65)

(6.63)

(3.26)

(3.76)

(3.28)

(3.07)

0.72**

0.67**

0.68**

0.68**

0.35

0.30

0.28

0.31

(2.54)

(2.38)

(2.43)

(2.411)

(0.96)

(0.81)

(0.76)

(0.85)

–0.03

–0.03

–0.04*

–0.04*

0.03

0.02

0.02

0.02

(–1.29)

(–1.62)

(–1.65)

(–1.65)

(1.01)

(0.77)

(0.72)

(0.86)

–0.80***

–0.80***

–0.76***

–0.76***

–0.61***

–0.64***

–0.61***

–0.60***

(–5.52)

(–5.57)

(–5.32)

(–5.32)

(–3.28)

(–3.42)

(–3.24)

(–3.18)

year

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Industry

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

Incl.

F

14.24

14.63

15.45

14.13

6.06

5.51

6.19

5.85

R-squared

0.2061

0.2054

0.2253

0.2247

0.1030

0.0928

0.0853

0.0933

1208

1208

1208

1208

1208

1208

1208

1208

Lev

Observations

We test the contagion effect of compensation regulation in Table 8, using a pooled sample of 456 observations on central SOEs, 402 observations on local SOEs, and
350 observations on non-SOEs.
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level (2-tailed).
See Appendix 1 for the definitions of the variables.

measure, the coefficient on Reg is –0.03 (t = –1.84, p < 0.1),
–0.08 (t = –5.58, p < 0.01), –0.01 (t = –0.66, p > 0.1)
for central SOEs, local SOEs, and non-SOEs, respectively. It
suggests that central SOEs and local SOEs experience reduced
firm performance after the compensation regulations but not
the non-SOEs, indicating the compensation regulation does
not have favorable economic consequences for the directly
affected central SOEs and the indirectly affected local SOEs via
contagion effects.

of SOEs. The government officers in Beijing and major
municipal areas could have higher political pressures compared
with their counterparts; therefore, we use two alternative
measures for the headquarter locations. The first measure is
coded as one if the company’s headquarters is located in
Beijing and zero otherwise. The second measure is coded
as one if the firm’s headquarters is located in Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangzhou, or Shenzhen, and zero otherwise.
Next, we include the alternative measures in the regression
along with its interactive term with Reg. The results (not
presented in table) show that the coefficients on Reg are
statistically significant and negative, when we use alternative
measures for headquarter location and compensation gap.

Robustness Test
First, to control for political pressures associated with locations,
we add measures on the headquarters geographical locations
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performance after the compensation regulations, indicating the
compensation regulation does not have favorable economic
consequences for the directly affected central SOEs and the
indirectly affected local SOEs.
One possible limitation of the study is that it didn’t
consider the effect of perks or in- on-the-job consumption
on executive compensation. The economic consequences of
regulations have led managers in SOEs to engage in higher onthe-job consumption. While it is possible that compensation
regulations could affect executive compensation, we focus on
the indirect contagion effects on local SOEs and non-SOEs.
Future studies can explore how individual managers respond to
the compensation regulations, whether perks are used in their
strategic responses, and whether such practices, if any, would
have a contagion effect on other firms.

The result indicates that executives in SOEs headquartered in
Beijing and major municipal areas do not show any significant
marginal difference regarding the impact of compensation
regulation compared with their counterparts.
Second, we use a pooled sample of central SOEs, local
SOEs, and non-SOEs and run again the regressions in Table 8.
As expected, central SOEs experienced more reductions in
the compensation gaps than others after the compensation
regulations, as indicated by the significant and negative
coefficients on CentralSOE∗ Reg. The only exception is in the
first column, where the coefficient on CentralSOE∗ Reg is –0.11
(t = –1.61, p > 0.1), which is marginally significant when
using one tail test. Similarly, local SOEs experienced more
reductions in the compensation gaps than others after the
compensation regulations, as indicated by the significant and
negative coefficients on LocalSOE∗ Reg in most columns. The only
exception is in the last third column, where the coefficient on
LocalSOE∗ Reg is –0.04 (t = –0.53, p > 0.1), which is statistically
insignificant. In contrast, non-SOEs experienced less reductions
in the compensation gaps than others after the compensation
regulations. Therefore, the results are qualitatively the same as
reported–we find contagion effect on local SOEs, but not on
non-SOEs.
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APPENDIX 1
Definition of Variables.

Variable

Explanation

GAPD

The measure of compensation gap, calculated as the logarithm of the difference between average executive compensation and average
employee compensation.

GAPR

The measure of compensation gap, calculated as the logarithm of the ratio of average executive compensation to average employee
compensation.

CentralSOE

A dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm is a central SOE, and zero otherwise

LocalSOE

A dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm is a local SOE, and zero otherwise

NonSOE

A dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm is not SOE, and zero otherwise

Reg

A dummy variable which is equal to one if the observation is from the post-regulation period, and zero otherwise

AffectedInd

An indicator variable which is equal to one if the firm is: (1) a non-SOE, and (2) there is at least one central enterprise included in the
regulation in the industry

Affected

A dummy variable that is equal to1 if a firm is in the same industry as the regulated central SOEs and zero otherwise

Duality

A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO and board chairman are the same person and zero otherwise

Stakeholder

The sum of squares of the share percentages held by the top 3 shareholders

Boardsize

The natural logarithm of total number of directors

IndBoard

The proportion of independent directors on board

Growth

The growth rate of operating income

LROA

ROA in previous year, using Net income divided by total asset in previous year

Lev

The long-term debt divided by total assets

Size

The natural logarithm of total assets

High-Tech industry

A dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is from a high-tech industry and zero otherwise

Regulated industry

A dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is from a regulated industry and zero otherwise

Finance industry

A dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is from a financial industry and zero otherwise

Province

A dummy variable that is equal to one if local SOEs are in the same province as the regulated central SOEs and zero otherwise

We define high-tech industry based on the Catalog of High-Tech Industry Statistics developed by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2002) http://www.stats.gov.
cn/tjsj/.
The regulated industries include petroleum, chemical, plastics, metal, non-metallic, electricity, gas, and water production and supply, transportation, warehousing, and
information technology industry.
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